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Abstract. Industrial Control Systems (ICS) are jeopardized from a
large set of threat vectors, which exploit their vulnerabilities in order
to impact the physical Critical Infrastructures they control. The Infor-
mation Technology (IT) classical approach to cyber attacks can not be
applied to ICS due to their extreme differences from main priorities to re-
source constrains. Therefore, innovative approaches and equipment must
be developed in order to suit with ICS world.
In this paper, a Smart Behavioural Filter (SBF) for the PLCs/RTUs
is proposed aiming to secure the PLC/RTU itself against logic attacks,
that are stealth for other more classical security approaches. Those logic
attacks are usually anomaly behaviours, for instance a large number of
open/close commands towards a valve. This smart field equipment can
communicate with other equipment like itself in order to react in short
time to cyber attacks and increase the resilience of the physical system. It
can also generate alarms for the local Intrusion Detection System (IDS)
The proposed equipment has been developed and validated in a real
test-bed within the FP7 CockpitCI project. The results are promising.
Key words: Industrial Control Systems, Security, Logic Filtering, Re-
dundancy
1 Introduction
Geographically distributed physical processes are continuously monitored and
controlled by means of a SCADA system. An important set of those physical
systems is usually defined as critical infrastructures, e.g., power grids, water
pipelines and transport networks. Nowadays, the SCADA systems faced new
challenges due to the increase of interconnected devices and due to the use of
standard hardware, software and network.
SCADA systems are usually composed of a set of networked devices, such
as sensors, actuators, controllers and communication equipment. The SCADA
server (also called Master Terminal Unit - MTU) gathers real-time data from
Remote Terminal Units (RTUs) and issues control commands (i.e., open or close
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electrical switches) towards field devices to control the physical process. Due
to the cyber-physical interaction, a cyber incidence can have a direct effect on
the physical world, as demonstrated by the Stuxnet worm attack that turned
off a centrifuges’ control system in a nuclear plant [1]. Stuxnet provided proof-
of-concept and demonstrated the feasibility of a cyber attack to change the
physical processes. Highly-skilled attackers have the potential to be the most
harmful, causing a loss of observability, controllability or eventually the loss of
power in the physical system. In this paper, a highly-skilled attacker is a person
with multiple capabilities: the ability to stealthy penetrate within a telecommu-
nication network and the ability to discover the physical process controlled by
the network.
In [2], the various type of attacks on SCADA systems have been grouped
into network protocol and application protocol attacks. In the network protocol
attacks, the hacker exploits weak points of network protocols, such as Modbus
TCP/IP, that have a number of serious vulnerabilities [3]. The common types of
those attacks are Denial of Service (DoS), scan and host discovery. Application
protocol attacks can cause damage to field devices by sending out improper com-
mands, because authentication or cryptographic mechanisms are not supported.
In general, application protocol attacks use unconventional commands at irreg-
ular interval, substituting the regular and predictable sets of commands used for
communication between SCADA servers and field devices. In both cases, these
attacks are preceded by some steps of information gathering devoted to finding
vulnerability security flaws in the network.
In this paper, we consider a highly-skilled attacker able to gain the access
of a SCADA network and to disrupt the physical process before the intrusion
is detected. A false logic attack, as in [4, 5], is invisible to Intrusion Detection
System (IDS) for SCADA networks, because it uses well-formed packets with a
content that is allowed even if a logic constraint is violated.
1.1 Contributions
The contribution of this paper is twofold. Although an host-based intrusion
detection system for anomaly behaviour is not new, its use within a SCADA
network is still a research area that is far from being completely explored. The
appliance presented in this paper is a behavioural filter that has to be inserted
between each each Remote Terminal Unit (RTU) or Programmable Logic Con-
troller (PLC) and the field network in order to intercept packets carrying incor-
rect or dangerous commands.
Second, the appliance (Smart Behavioural Filter - SBF) communicates with
other similar appliances and with a possible local Intrusion Detection System
(IDS) through an additional secure channel in order to generate another invisible
network for transmitting/receiving alert messages.
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1.2 Paper Organization
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 surveys the literature of the appli-
ances for anomaly behaviour; in Section 3 the ecosystem made of several smart
appliances in a SCADA network is described in order to provide an overall pic-
ture of the main functionalities; in Section 4 the Smart Behavioural Filter (SBF)
is detailed in terms of functionalities and design; the implementation and the
first results are presented in Section 5; finally, conclusions and future works are
in Section 6.
2 Related Works
A SCADA system is considered a critical control system since it monitors and
controls the performance and availability of other critical infrastructures, such as
transport systems, energy suppliers, water treatment systems or communication
systems.
SCADA networks are vulnerable to threats as the traditional IT networks.
Moreover, SCADA networks have different risk management priorities: in SCADA
network, availability is preferred to confidentiality, while in IT systems the prior-
ities are turned around. This makes difficult implement traditional IT solutions
for security within SCADA networks. [6]
During the last years, several defence approaches have been studied. One of
the first recommendation is to segment the SCADA network from the enterprise
one using suitable firewalls in order to protect PLCs/RTUs from unauthorized re-
quests that originate from outside the field. [7] In time-critical systems, firewalls
must be carefully introduced for reducing additional packet latency. Filtering un-
wanted traffic by means of a firewall can increase the network performances. [8]
Firewall are classified into two categories: Packet filtering and application
firewall. Packet filtering has been recommended as an effective way to protect
field devices from network protocol attacks. This appliance monitors incoming
and outgoing packets and allows them to route or drop based on filtering rules
using layer three and four on OSI model. [2]
An application firewall (or proxy server) is placed between a client applica-
tion and a server, acting as an intermediary never allowing a direct connection
between them. [9] The application firewall adds the capability of examining spe-
cific application traffic, such as FTP services, OPC servers or others. Coverage
for SCADA applications is limited and performance impact is typically greater
than other firewall types. The benefits of using this method are important be-
cause the application firewall is the only thing exposed to untrusted traffic. The
disadvantage of the approach is that it must be tuned to each application al-
lowed. [10]
In this paper, we present an advanced filter for detecting false logic attacks.
A false attack [4] takes into account two different approaches:
– False data values, where the attacker changes the data coming from sensors,
see the literature related to false data injection [11];
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– False logic commands, where the attacker changes the logic of the control
commands. This type of attack is the main focus of this paper.
In [4, 5], the feasibility of a false logic attack is modelled considering the case
of two valves that can be opened or closed. Two logic constrains are considered:
(1) they cannot be both in open state, and (2) valve 1 should be opened be-
fore valve 2. The results of this paper demonstrates how a traditional Intrusion
Detection System (IDS) is not able to effectively protect the physical process.
The Smart Behavioural Filter (SBF) is able to detect the violation of a logic
constraint that can been implemented as a rule.
In the following Section, the ecosystem is detailed. The smart ecosystem is
realized using a set of Smart Behavioural Filters (SBFs) placed just in front
of the PLCs that can interact between them and with a local IDS using an
additional radio-frequency channel.
3 Smart Ecosystem
In Fig. 1, the architecture of the smart ecosystem is depicted. The Smart Be-
havioural Filter filters the commands coming from the SCADA system through
a set of rules and also the information coming from the other elements of the
smart ecosystems. The SBF has three channel:
1. A legacy channel for receiving/sending command packets from and to the
SCADA system;
2. An additional channel for communicating with the PLC/RTU in order to
send authorized commands;
3. An additional channel for exchanging messages with the other SBFs or with
an IDS. This channel has been realised using radio-frequency module.
The aim of this ecosystem is a local and fast reaction to advanced cyber
attacks. The SBF that intercepts a false logic attack can block the commands
and then is able to send an alarm to the IDS and to other near SBFs using the
radio frequency. In this way, the SBF can increase the alert level and therefore
augment the security controls in event of cyber attacks to other near facilities.
4 Smart Behavioural Filter (SBF)
Traditional RTUs/PLCs send to the SCADA server the actual data coming from
sensors, receive commands to be translated for the actuators and execute fast
and real time control strategies related to the physical process. The difference
between a PLC and an RTU is usually hard to find especially because their
functionalities overlap with each other. In this paper we use both the terms
RTU and PLC for identifying a remote controller which communicate with the
SCADA server. The PLC is able to detect the disconnection of a sensor or an
actuators.
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Fig. 1. system diagram of the smart ecosystem, where blue icons represent the legacy
SCADA system and the red ones represent the elements of the smart ecosystem.
The Smart Behavioural Filter (SBF) wants to add a new class of logical
errors, detected directly by the PLC. Those errors are usually malicious cyber
attacks but can also be generated from unintentional commands coming from an
operator. These false logic errors are, among the others: contradictory instruc-
tions, dangerous or out of the normal operating cycle, or abnormal sequence of
operations.
The Smart Behavioural Filter (SBF) intends to create a further security
element for industrial control systems. This new appliance element was created
as a security system at application level which is able to work on industrial
communication protocols. The technological solutions implemented in the SBF
are mostly known and simple to apply but the smart combination allows us to
get a very interesting and innovative element in the context of industrial security.
The SBF, in Fig. 2, is made of two main modes: the passive and the reactive
one. The first concept is related to the filtering action, mainly related to logical
constraints. The second one is related to the response and mitigation action:
an SBF can cooperate with other SBFs in event of an external attacks, and
can eventually change its operating mode until the complete isolation from the
external world.
In order to filter packets, PLC registers and coils have been mirrored within
the SBF in order to understand the impact of the received commands. The first
important cyber security feature of SBF concerns the capability to create a kind
of SandBox (a virtual controlled environment) that replicates the information
system of a PLC. In those circumstances, an hypothetical intruder, which enters
into the SCADA network, believes he is changing the registers/coils value into
the PLC performing successfully the cyber attack but without have any effect
on system thanks to the SBF. The Ethernet module of the PLC is securely
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Fig. 2. Diagram of the Smart Behavioural Filter
connected to the Ethernet module of the SBF, that substitute the PLC port. In
this way, the SBF can guarantee to be undetectable to an intruder, who beliefs
to communicate with the original PLC.
SBF implements a rule-based filtering, able to understand the effects of spe-
cific commands thanks to a set of rules. Those rules have been hard-wired into
the SBF starting from the knowledge of the physical processes. For a Medium
Voltage power grid, the SCADA system reconfigures the physical network after
a permanent failure, in well-define scheme. Therefore, the reconfiguration is a se-
quence of commands sent from the SCADA control system to the PLCs connect-
ing the electrical switches. The possible reconfiguration procedures are modelled
within the set of possible rules inside the SBF. The SBF is an application-level
behavioural filtering performing an anomaly detection highly specialized in its
own operative context.
In order to be an active appliance, each SBF is equipped with its own Ra-
dio Frequency (RF) Module able to create a mesh-network between all the
PLCs/RTUs with SBFs and with a possible local IDS. The radio frequency
module has a limit due to the distance of the transmission channel. This RF
element, in combination with the SBF, establishes a redundant wireless network
between PLCs/RTUs of the same system and then a further preferential (or
alternative) communication channel where transmits system alerts.
The system alerts can eventually activate specific rules that increase the
security status of the PLC. The security status can require an higher level of
authentication in performing specific commands. In the worst case, the PLC can
be isolated from outside world for a limited amount of time in order to avoid a
more dangerous situation and preserve the physical process actuators.
The additional radio frequency channel creates a new security issue, but
it is invisible to a hacker which penetrates in the classical telecommunication
network. The additional channel can exploit secure communications, such as
encryption, due to the small dimension of the exchanged messages.
Briefly summarizing, an SBF is able to:
1. Mirror the PLC registers to deceive the intruder;
2. Recognize false logic events or sequence of events;
3. Alert the other closest SBFs and the eventual local IDS;
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4. Change its security status in accordance with a pre-set strategy.
Another feature of the SBF is the undetectability and the transparency at
the communication level and for a malicious attacker. In the following section
the implementation and some results are explained.
5 Implementation and First Results
In order to implement the features described in the previous section, we need a
platform that could:
– Receive commands from the field network
– Reconstruct the instructions received
– Filter through the rules’ instructions
– Send the filtered commands to the connected PLC
– Send and receive alarm messages to / from the other SBFs
– React to cyber attacks through a set of fixed rules
A standard RTU/PLC has a modular design, and usually consists of a Power
Supply, a CPU, and an Input/output card. The actual and initial implementation
of the SBF is realized on hardware using a microcomputer such as Raspberry
PI, as in Fig. 3.
In order to test the SBF, we consider as PLC a Schneider Electric Modicon
M340 [12] with Modbus TCP/IP interface. The SBF receives packets and it is
invisible to the downstream PLC and also to the rest of the control network.
The SBF is advanced network card with additional processing capabilities.
The SBF has been integrated within the existing Roma TRE testbed [13].
The testbed is made of a SCADA server, a PLC and an IDS. Specifically, the
IDS has been given the ability to communicate through the radio frequency
(RF) protocol with the mesh network created by SBFs. This feature improves
globally and locally the situational awareness. A soon as the IDS recognizes a
potential threat it warns the control room and sends a broadcast alert message
to the radio frequency network. Depending on the danger degree, the SBF can
automatically reconfigure themselves in an attempt to mitigate the threat.
The results are promising: the Smart PLC (PLC and SBF, together) suc-
ceeds to recognize the dangerous instructions and sends an alert message to the
control room. At the same time provides information on the incident to the other
reachable Smart PLC that are reconfigured in an appropriate way and, in case
it is required, turn over the alert message to the control room. The IDS is able
to communicate the details of an attack to the network of Smart PLC which
reconfigures itself, thus obtaining an automatic response to the ongoing threat.
Depending on the type of attack will also change response policies. Smart
PLCs will then be able to decide and implement the best strategy in each case.
The SBF has been implemented and validated within the FP7 European
CockpitCI project (www.cockpitci.eu).
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Fig. 3. Implementation of the SBF using a Raspberry Pi microcomputer. Two USB
ports are used for exchanging commands with the PLC (with a network adapter) and
the other SBF, using an USB radio frequency module.
6 Conclusions and Ongoing Works
In this paper, we present a Smart Behavioural Filter (SBF) able to detect and
block commands that are anomalous from a logic point of view. This anomalous
behaviour can be interpreted as a very specific cyber attack performed by a
high-skilled attacker.
The SBF is a passive firewall and is also a local reaction module for mitigating
risk of cyber attacks. In order to exchange securely information, the SBF has an
additional and invisible radio frequency channel among SBFs and the IDS.
The SBF can be improved considering rules that can be modified or generated
through an on-line training of the physical system.
Actual works are more related to the industrial Internet of Things (IoTs),
see Fig. 4. The SBF can also be applied in the modern industrial system. This
is possible integrating a further module which is entrusted with the task of IoT
Connector. This connector enables the outsourcing of the data coming from
industrial sensors to collect and analyse them thanks to Industrial Cloud IoT.
Therefore, the SCADA system transfers some functionalities to the Industrial
Cloud IoT to improve performances, decrease start-up plant costs and enhance
data mining.
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Fig. 4. Future development and possible integration with Internet of Things (IoTs)
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